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ABSTRACT 
 We develop a model that is a combination of Lanchester and Deitchman attrition 
models and population epidemic models. Based on different attrition, recruitment, and 
transition rules, we study the relationships between dynamic population flow and 
insurgency success or failure. The goal of our work is to provide an analytical framework 
for these situations, and to analyze the effect of different initial conditions and 
interactions on the success or failure of an insurgency. The models developed herein are 
descriptive, not predictive, and are designed to give decision makers an insight into a 
complex insurgency process. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Irregular warfare is not a new form of warfare. Weaker forces have always 
utilized irregular tactics to attack a more powerful foe. United States conventional 
military superiority forces our foes to adopt these irregular tactics to have any reasonable 
chance of success. Current conventional military models and tools are ill-suited for 
analytical analysis of this type of warfare. The human element and the importance of 
population support are magnified in these types of conflicts and new tools must be 
developed.  
Our tools are attrition and population epidemic models originally developed for 
conventional warfare and for the study of the spread of infectious diseases. Our 
fundamental premise is that a combination of these two types of models can yield 
important insights into the key relationships between an insurgency and the contested 
population.  
We consider two models: a base model with constant parameters, and more 
advanced model with opportunistic and idealistic recruitment, various levels of 
government effort against the insurgency and different ways of modeling population 
support. We find, much like the real world, that initial conditions and policy decisions 
have a strong impact on the outcome of the conflict. Opposing factions that tailor their 
tactics to the situation (a government focusing on securing the population in a security 
minded public) have a much greater chance of success. We also demonstrate the 
importance of good intelligence.  
 xvi




Traditional wargames and models that apply to conventional warfare do not fare 
well when applied to asymmetric conflicts such as insurgency and guerrilla warfare. 
Legacy force-on-force models that capture attrition, detection, and movement have less 
utility in measuring intangible affects, which include population behavior, civil-military 
operations, and psychological operations - all central aspects in insurgency and counter-
insurgency situations. The human component of this type of conflict makes analysis 
extremely difficult, but not impossible. 
One of the more important aspects of low intensity conflicts, guerrilla warfare, 
and insurgencies is population control and population influence. These types of conflicts 
center on the effort to win the support of the population. An insurgency cannot exist 
without some degree of population support. If we divide the total population into distinct 
groups of supporters and contrarians, it should be possible to model the transfer and 
movement of individuals among these population subclasses and analyze the overall 
effect their support has on the contending factions. We simplify movement between these 
subclasses and model them for analysis. Being in a particular supporting population 
subclass does not particularly mean organized membership in the insurgency or 
government, but rather represents willing or coerced support of that particular 
organization. Individuals move from subclass to subclass based on the actions and non-
actions of the insurgency and the government.  These activities include non-violent 
actions: civil affairs, psychological operations, and propaganda; and more violent and 
direct action such as coercion, combat, terrorist acts, criminal activities, and collateral 
damage. Some activities are more difficult to quantify than others, especially the 
activities directly related to human behavior.   
Population influence models have already been developed from dynamic 
population models and epidemiological models to study information flow through 
populations. Warfare attrition models have been in development and use for nearly 100 
years. This thesis examines the utility of combining dynamic population influence models 
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and conventional deterministic attrition models to develop a new Irregular Warfare model 
to analyze the relationship between irregular warfare and population influence and 
control.   
If conventional warfare is a complex situation that is difficult to model in the best 
of circumstances, then unconventional warfare is a nightmare for analytical analysis. 
Irregular strategies rely heavily on deception and deceit. Many aspects of this type of 
warfare (recruitment, desertion, psychological warfare, etc.) are based on individual 
human behavior and are very difficult to model. The primary goal of this thesis is to 
provide a descriptive tool to help understand cause-and-effect relations in the context of 
insurgency warfare directly related to population support and control.  
Chapter II provides a short explanation of irregular and guerrilla warfare, a review 
of conventional and unconventional combat attrition models, an examination of 
epidemiological models as applied to quantitative modeling of population dynamics, and 
an investigation of current efforts by the United States Department of Defense (DOD) 
and other civilian agencies to analytically study the phenomenon of irregular warfare.     
Chapter III develops and explains our irregular warfare and population model including 
explanations of notation, terminology, and model assumptions.  Chapter IV analyses our 
model and explores its behavior based on reasonable real world initial conditions based 
on data gathered on the current asymmetric conflict in Iraq.  Chapter V presents our 





II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. 
— Mao Tse Tung 
A. GUERRILLA WARFARE 
Irregular and asymmetric warfare have always been the strategies of choice for 
mismatched combatants: the ‘weak’ against the ‘strong’. Insurgency has probably been 
the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the creation of organized political 
communities. This type of conflict has experienced a major resurgence: between 1969 
and 1985 the number of major international terrorist incidents alone jumped from just 
under two hundred to over eight hundred per year. (O’Neill, 2005)  In this historically 
important mode of conflict, the United States has an almost unbroken string of frustration 
(and disappointment) that can be traced backward nearly half a century from the situation 
in Iraq today to the early 1960s when the United States became heavily engaged in 
Indochina’s wars. (Hoffman, 2004) 
Terms like insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism have been defined in 
various ways and used interchangeably throughout the years. For a common basis, we 
define insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in 
which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational 
expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or 
sustain the basis of legitimacy of one ore more aspects of politics.” (O’Neill, 2005) 
Guerrilla warfare and terrorism can be defined as violent tactics of insurgent conflicts. 
These tactics primarily include avoiding direct confrontation and carefully choosing 
battles to maximize local force superiority. As in any conflict, the side most able to 
maximize its strengths and minimize its weaknesses is most likely to emerge victorious. 
Most insurgencies would seem to face overwhelming weaknesses and insurmountable 
odds when the conventional measuring sticks of strengths and weaknesses are applied. A 
closer examination reveals the inherent strengths of this type of warfare that have 
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bedeviled conventional militaries since the dawn of warfare. Insurgency leaders know 
that they risk destruction by confronting government forces in direct conventional 
engagements so they opt to erode the strength of the government through the use of 
terrorism or guerrilla warfare, not only to increase the human and material cost to the 
government but also to demonstrate its failure to maintain effective control and provide 
protection for the people. (O’Neill, 2005)    
An irregular approach to warfare more keenly focuses on war as an extension of 
politics and is fought immediately among the people. In fact, the terrain of this battlefield 
can be thought of as the population the government and the insurgency are fighting to 
influence and control; a zero-sum conflict over the same political-space. (McCormick and 
Giordano, 2002) Evidence amassed on guerrilla battlefields over the last three decades 
indicates that civilian support is the essential element of successful guerrilla operations. 
(O’Neill, 2005) 
Insurgency strategies can be broken down into four broad strategic approaches: 
conspiratorial, protracted popular war, military focus, and urban warfare. The 
conspiratorial strategy seeks to remove the ruling authorities through a limited but swift 
use of force. (O’Neill, 2005) This strategy favors quick decisive action and external 
support is generally not a major consideration. Another strategy that relies heavily on a 
small armed group with little external support is the military focus strategy, or guerrilla 
“foco,” developed by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in the 1960’s. (O’Neill, 2005) This 
strategy relies on a small guerrilla focus, or foco, to take up arms and become the nucleus 
of a popular army. Needless to say, a weak government seems to be a necessity for the 
success of the foco strategy. It is debatable if Castro would have had as much success had 
he not faced the profoundly divided and weak Batista government. Che Guevara’s 
spectacular failure in Bolivia only illustrates that any reasonably strong government 
would take resolute steps to eradicate any insurgency that threatens their political system. 
(O’Neill, 2005)   
The third primary insurgency strategy, and the strategy we are most interested in 
examining is the strategy of protracted popular war. This strategy is conceptually the 
most elaborate and, perhaps, the most widely copied strategy. (O’Neill, 2005) Although 
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this strategy has existed for thousands of years, Mao is considered the primary architect 
of this strategy for his successful Chinese Communist victory. Mao offered insurgents 
around the world a cohesive, systematic blueprint for their own struggles against colonial 
occupiers or oppressive indigenous regimes. (O’Neill, 2005) We are most interested in 
the protracted popular war effort because insurgencies utilizing this strategy must gain 
and maintain extensive popular support to have any chance for ultimate victory. There is 
a mathematical linkage between attrition in insurgency warfare and population dynamics 
modeling, which allows researchers to examine this aspect of the strategy analytically.   
B. MODELING GUERRILLA WARFARE 
Frederick Lanchester developed his attrition equations for military conflict in 







                    (1) 
the attrition is proportional to an attrition coefficient and the size of both forces. This 
model is usually associated with area fire: indirect artillery weapons or fire into an area 
where an unseen enemy is located (like an ambushing guerrilla force). With aimed fire 







            (2) 
the attrition of one side is proportional only to the opponent’s size and its effectiveness 
(attrition coefficients A or B).  The square law and the linear law are so named because 
they reveal a powerful insight about area versus direct fire weapons. In the linear law, 
assuming equal effectiveness between forces, the winner is determined only by the larger 








<  then the y 
forces win. In the square law, however, the square of the size of the forces is proportional 
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=  is a fight to the death and an increase 
in the attrition coefficient in the square model can be overcome by a small increase in the 
size of the relative forces. In both of these models the battle is characterized by the initial 
force levels and the attrition coefficients. In the square law model (or modern combat 
model) the fighting strength of a force can be represented by the square of its numerical 
strength. Lanchester originally proposed these combat models to argue the benefits of 
force concentration in modern warfare and especially in the burgeoning area of air 
combat. Further analysis led to other interesting applications of these equations. 
In “A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare,” S.J. Deitchman (1962) 
incorporated both the linear and square laws in an early attempt to mathematically model 




= −             (3) 
If the guerrilla can take advantage of its informational advantage it can choose its 
conflicts wisely leading to local force superiority and the utilization of ambush tactics.  In 
this type of battle, ambushed conventional forces are unable to target the guerrillas and 
must fire blindly into the area the guerrillas occupy. Guerrilla losses are proportional to 
the number of ambushed forces firing and the number of guerrillas occupying the area. 
(Deitchman, 1962) The guerrillas are able to fire at the conventional forces in full view 
and hence conventional losses are only proportional to the number of guerrillas firing. 
This leads to a linear law (1) of attrition for the guerrilla side, and a square law of 






=             (4) 
A key difference from the original Lanchester equations is that the attrition 
coefficients (A and B) in this case can differ by orders of magnitude. Area fire has 
reduced the effectiveness of conventional troops by possibly 10-100 times because the 
probability of unaimed fire hitting a small ambushing force is much smaller than the 
probability of aimed fire hitting fully exposed troops. These equations also do not take 
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into account the element of surprise that an ambushing force possesses. Ambush tactics 
are not the sole providence of the guerrillas If the government forces can turn the 
situation around and attack the guerrillas using small groups, ambush tactics, and local 
numerical superiority then the guerrillas’ chances of winning become very small indeed. 
(Deitchman, 1962) Ambush tactics are heavily reliant on intelligence which is a key 
element of an effective insurgency.  
In “The Dynamics of Insurgency,” Gordon McCormick and Frank Giordano 
(2002) expand this analysis of guerrilla warfare by adding the effects of popular opinion, 





dx xa x m xy
dt k




           (5) 
Deitchman had already recognized the linear and square law relationships of 
attrition between the guerrilla and government forces; McCormick and Giordano took the 
analysis a step further and attempted to quantify the ability of these combatants to recruit 
and mobilize forces from a core constituency and measure the state’s and insurgency’s 
ability to ‘see’ each other during the conflict. The contested political population is 
divided into three categories of people at any time: potential government supporters, 
potential insurgency supporters and the undecided. (McCormick & Giordano, 2002)  
Given a starting “popular will,” growth intensities (the recruitment and growth rates for 
the insurgency and government respectively), and combat effectiveness parameters for 
units, we can now model both the attrition of forces based on irregular warfare tactics and 
strategy, and the mobilization and recruitment of forces based on popular will. One more 
significant factor needs to be incorporated: information. The insurgency begins with an 
ability to see their opponents, but a very limited ability to attack what they see. The state 
faces the opposite dilemma: a much greater ability to attack what it does see, but a 
limited ability to see what it wishes to attack. (McCormick & Giordano, 2002) 
McCormick and Giordano modify the effectiveness parameters of each side based on 
their information advantage or disadvantage. Information, in their model, is a 
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conditioning variable that, for any given force balance, can improve or degrade each 
side’s capacity to target the other. (McCormick & Giordano, 2002) Essentially, 
McCormick and Giordano expanded Deitchman’s area and linear equations for guerrilla 
conflict and introduced growth (a and b) and support (kx and ky) parameters for 
recruitment and mobilization. By attempting to quantify, at a basic level, the political and 
informational efforts of government and insurgent forces, McCormick and Giordano had 
taken a major step in modeling the soft combat efforts of information warfare, recruiting, 
and humanitarian efforts that are of enhanced importance in insurgencies.    
C. POPULATION DYNAMICS MODELING 
Mathematical modeling of epidemiological phenomenon has been developed and 
studied since the beginning of the 20th century. At its core, mathematical epidemiological 
modeling can be utilized to map disease progression through a human population. This is 
accomplished by dividing the population into subclasses that reflect the epidemiological 
status of individuals who in turn transit between classes via mutual contact at given 
average rates. (Bettencourt, Cintron-Arias, Kaiser, & Castillo-Chavez, 2006) More 
advanced models can be used to identify the role of specific population characteristics 
such as age, variable infectivity, and variable infectious periods. (Bettencourt et al., 2006) 
Studies have shown the quantitative similarities between the spread of ideas and 
dynamic fanatic behaviors through a population and the dynamics of the spread of 
infectious diseases. These similarities have been developed and studied as early as 1953. 
Instead of dividing populations into epidemiological subclasses, these models are more 
interested in social states: ignorants, spreaders, and stiflers. Bettencourt, et al draw 
parallels between epidemics and idea diffusion in their paper “The Power of a Good Idea: 
Quantitative Modeling for the Spread of Ideas from Epidemiological Models,” while 
Carlos Castillo-Chavez and Baojun Song take the modeling in a new direction with 
“Models for the Transmission Dynamics of Fanatic Behaviors.” By dividing an entire 
population into non-core, susceptible, semi-fanatic, and fanatic sub-populations, and 
developing mathematical interactions, Castillo-Chavez and Song attempts to model the 
recruitment and conversion of one sub-population entity to another sub-population.   
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1 1 3
dG CG E F G
dt T
β γ γ µ= Λ − + + −  
1 2 1
dS C E FG S S S
dt T C
β β γ µ+= − −               (6) 
2 3
dE E F FS E E
dt C C
β β µ+= + −  
3 3
dF FE F F
dt C
β γ µ= − −  
In this mode, G is the non-core population, S is the susceptible portion, and E and 
F are the semi-fanatic and fanatic parts. The ‘core’ population, the susceptible, semi-
fanatic and fanatic subpopulations recruit from the non-core general population through 
“contacts” between core and non-core individuals. (Castillo-Chavez & Song, 2004)  
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the flow of individuals through the 
different sub-population. iβ  measures the strength of the recruitment and iγ  denotes the 
per-capita recovery rate for each subpopulation in the core, hence, 1
iγ  is the average 







Figure 1.   Flow Chart of Castillo-Chavez & Song Model (2004) 
 
This type of model does not describe a strictly evolutionary process because 
individuals can visit different states more than once, unlike many epidemiological models 
where individuals are often immune to a disease after they are vaccinated or survive the 
disease. By modeling the transfer of individuals between possibly contrarian 
subpopulations, Castillo-Chavez and Song have taken a step in creating a dynamic 
population model that represents a core constituency for opposing political and military 
forces. 
D. CURRENT EFFORTS 
Harrison C. Schramm expanded on these models and developed deterministic and 
stochastic models for the flow of diametrically opposed ideas. These ideas are actively 
supported or opposed by individuals who actively vie for a greater share of support from 
the public. An interesting result of his efforts is that it takes a relatively small number of 
contrarians to overcome a large increase in the supporter of an idea. (Schramm, 2006) 














and destroy insurgencies and terrorist organizations (Hammes, 2006), and agent based 
modeling and simulation consisting of discrete heterogeneous sets of individual agents 
each with its own characteristic properties and rules of behavior. Agent based modeling 
(ABM) is an increasingly popular tool to explore artificial life and the basic idea that 
complicated global behavior of a system derives from low level interaction of its 
constituent agents. Insights about real-world systems are hoped to be gained by ABM, 
but modeling large systems with vast numbers of agents, characteristics, and rules 
become prohibitively difficult in computing time and power.   
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III. INSURGENCY ATTRITION MODEL WITH DYNAMIC 
POPULATION SUPPORT 
All models are wrong, some are useful. 
 
— George Box 
A. OVERVIEW 
The basis for the insurgency attrition model presented in this thesis is a 
combination of Lanchester and Deitchman difference-equation attrition models with 
epidemiological population models for the transfer of individuals from population 
subclasses to other population subclasses. Recall the base guerrilla warfare equations 





dx xa x m xy
dt k




           (7) 
The attrition to the government forces y follows Lanchester’s square law and the 
attrition to the insurgency x follows Lanchester’s linear law. Our model will incorporate 
this area vs. direct fire concept but with a focus on attrition caused to the insurgency. The 
growth and support parameters for the insurgency (b and ky) in the McCormick model are 
replaced by a population transition model based on epidemiological models similar to 
those developed by Castillo-Chavez and Song (Figure 1) except we have simplified the 
population dynamics by creating only two subpopulations and one population transition 
parameter. This simpler model (Figure 2) allows basic analysis of population transition 
based on a transition parameter SCρ  and the interaction between the supporter S(t) and 
contrarian C(t) populations. Individuals can also be recruited out of the contrarian 
population to increase the strength of the insurgency ( )I t . 
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Figure 2.    Flow Chart of Population Model 
 
Unlike the McCormick and Giordano model, our model has no recruitment or 
physical attrition to the government forces, but rather degradation in the government’s 
ability and will to fight the insurgency. In a protracted popular war the insurgency is 
initially too weak to affect the government forces in terms of men and material. The 
insurgency’s initial goal is to grow themselves to a force level large enough enter the 
conventional phase of the conflict and challenge the government forces. Until they reach 
the conventional phase, attrition against the government is a useful tool to gain 
recruitment, increase insurgent morale, and stay relevant. Government strength in this 
model is represented only by the “effort” they expend against the insurgency, the 
intelligence they gather, and the support from the friendly portion of the population. 
Since the insurgency cannot attrite the government forces to any appreciable degree the 
government’s strength level is constant and is only a scaling factor that can be eliminated 
from the final model.  




API: attrition to the population caused by the insurgency. 
APG: attrition to the population caused by the government.      
AP: total attrition to the population (API + APG). 
AG: attrition to the government caused by the insurgency. 
AI: attrition to the insurgency caused by the government.  
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Policy parameters: 
     γ : government attrition coefficient against the insurgency. 
     Gα : insurgency attrition coefficient against the government. 
     Pα : insurgency attrition coefficient against the population. 
Intelligence and population  parameters: 
     µ : intelligence level of the government about the insurgency. 
     SCρ : rate at which individuals change from Supporters to Contrarians or vice versa.  
     CIρ : measures the recruitment rate for the insurgency. 
Population and Insurgency:      
     I(t): size of the insurgency at time t . 
     S(t): measures the portion of the population that supports the government at time t. 
     C(t): measures the portion of the population that supports the insurgency at time t. 
 
( ) ( )S t C t+  is the total contested political population. All of the parameters in the 
model are scaled by the total contested population so ( ) ( )S t C t+ = 1. The insurgency, 
( ) ( )I t C t≤ , is also represented by a number between 0 and 1. I(t) does not represent a 
direct proportion of the total population. It is a fraction of the contrarian population and a  
measure of the strength of the insurgency’s numbers and influence over time. In a real 
insurgency when the insurgency reaches a certain level of strength it will either displace 
the government and seize power or possibly enter into a protracted conventional conflict. 
Our focus is in examining the parameters and processes that influence an insurgency’s 
rise or decline. 
In this model an important assumption is that transfer of information among the 
insurgency, government, and population is immediate and truthful, i.e. collateral damage 
to the population caused by the government is immediately recognized by the population 
as violence caused by the government; it cannot be blamed on the insurgency and vice 
versa. This assumption ignores the ability of contending factions to incorporate some 
aspects of misinformation in their strategies.  
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The overall model can be broken down into two main sections: attrition dynamics 
and population dynamics. 
B. ATTRITION DYNAMICS 
In our model, we are interested in examining the effects of attrition to the 
insurgency through different government policies and actions. The goal of a counter-
insurgency campaign is to attrite the insurgency to a point of irrelevance. This can be 
anywhere from complete annihilation to some level of tolerable insurgency size and 
activity. Due to their advantages in size (personnel and equipment), training and 
firepower, a reasonably established government military force has the capability to 
eradicate an opposing guerrilla force if that guerrilla force is fully exposed. Whether 
government forces have the political will and/or information advantage necessary to 
bring their conventional combat advantages to bear in an unconventional conflict of this 
type is another matter. The guerrilla forces have a much more challenging mission: defeat 
a more powerful and more established state. They are unlikely to have the relative 
“knockout” ability the government possesses. Their actions to attrite the government are 
based on eroding the political will and popular support of the government.   
Attrition to the government is represented in the model, but the insurgency does 
not “win” by defeating the powers that be.  The insurgency wins by not losing: by 
consuming the states political space and replacing the government itself. Initially 
insurgency operations against the government have very little effect on the total strength 
of the government forces, but they can have a large impact on the perceptions of the 
population and the morale of the insurgents. In this model, government forces do not 
suffer physical attrition. Attrition caused to the government by the insurgency has other 
affects: increased insurgency recruitment, increased contrarian support and possibly 
increased government efforts against the insurgency. The insurgency can also try to show 
the incompetence of the government forces by publicly defeating them and/or attempting 
to gain control of a geographic or geopolitical area for a period of time. The insurgency 
attrition coefficient against the government Gα  is multiplied by the size of the 
insurgency, I(t).  
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( )G GA I tα=              (8) 
In general, the insurgency conducts three primary forms of organized violence: 
terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare. (O’Neill, 2005) The first two are 
the tactics of the weak against the strong utilized to harass and gradually erode the will 
and capability of the state. The insurgency attrition coefficient Gα  is a reflection of the 
tactics utilized by the insurgency. Once an insurgency has matched the size and strength 
of the government forces they can move into the conventional combat phase of irregular 
warfare and more directly affect the military forces of the government. In that case, other 
combat models are more applicable.  
In order to examine the attrition to the insurgency and the attrition to the 
population it is necessary to examine the impact of government intelligence. The only 
real advantage that most insurgencies possess over their more conventional government 
foes is in the area of information. The ability of the insurgency to choose when and where 
to fight can overcome their force deficiencies. To overcome this information advantage, 
government forces must maximize their counter-insurgency (COIN) intelligence and 
counter-intelligence efforts. Many intelligence gathering activities are directly related to 
the amount of active population support for the government. In our model, the level of 
intelligence for government forces µ is between 0 (no intelligence) and 1 (perfect 
intelligence) and is directly related to the amount of government supporters in the total 
population. The return on this population support in regards to the intelligence efforts 
against the insurgency can be modeled by a variety of functions. Figure 3 represents four 
functions that could represent different intelligence levels as a function of the population 































Figure 3.    Intelligence Functions 
 
A convex function requires significant population support for the government to 
have a reasonable intelligence level about the insurgency, while a concave function is just 
the opposite: minimal government support provides significant intelligence dividends. 
The sigmoid function provides for steep increases and declines around a median point (in 
this case 0.5 government support).  The simplest function is a linear relationship 
between the support of the population for the government and the intelligence level 
against the insurgency. 
Now we can examine the other three types of attrition in the insurgency model: 
attrition to the insurgency, attrition to the population caused by the insurgency and 
attrition to the population caused by the government. 
The government attrition coefficient against the insurgency is represented by γ  
which takes into account a number of government capabilities, activities and policy 
decisions. One common government policy is to conduct counter-insurgency activities 
when either the government forces or the population are attacked by an insurgency. Other 
possible policies include ignoring attacks against the population and/or attacking a 
political entity when it is first detected regardless of its offensive nature. The former 
would seem to be a losing proposition in the long run as the population would quickly 
lose confidence in the government’s ability to provide security. The latter is a policy that 
police states undertake to eliminate political movements. Attrition caused to the 
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population in the form of collateral damage by the government could be a factor that 
dampens the overall effort and effectiveness of the government’s operations. In general, 
we describe this parameter as monotonically increasing in AG and API and monotonically 
decreasing in APG.  
γ = AG+API-APG              (9) 
A more complex relationship could emphasize a stronger reaction to attacks on 
government forces, 
γ = 2AG+API-APG               (10) 





γ =           (11) 
We discuss government policies and dynamics that can represent these equations 
in Chapter IV.  
Attrition to the insurgency is the primary effort of the government forces; the 
objectives are to find, fix, and destroy the insurgency. This attrition against the 
insurgency is affected by three main factors: the government’s offensive counter-
insurgency effort, γ , the government’s intelligence level, µ , and the size of the 
insurgency, I(t). The overall COIN effort,γ , can represent straightforward offensive 
effort against any threats to the regime, or a more complicated set of policy decisions 
based on insurgency activities, size, and intelligence factors, such as the ability to quickly 
and accurately process intelligence and provide the information to the operators in the 
field. This effort factor is multiplied by the intelligence factorµ  and the complement of 
the intelligence factor, (1 )µ− , times the size of the insurgency, I(t). 
( (1 ) ( ))IA I tγ µ µ= + −         (12) 
This formula essentially splits the offensive efforts of the government into two 
parts: the effective (aimed fire) γµ portion and the less effective (guerrilla warfare area 
fire) (1 ) ( )I tγ µ−  portion. As we will see in the examination of APG, this less effective 
area fire portion of the government effort is directly related to the collateral damage 
caused by the government to the population. When the intelligence level approaches the 
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maximum of 1, then the government effort γ  is completely effective in the sense that it is 
perfectly and effectively aimed at the insurgency only. Equation (12) then simplifies to 
the aimed fire Lanchester square law: IA γµ=  whereµ is 1. Recall that because the 
government forces do not suffer physical attrition, the government force level is constant 
throughout the model and can therefore be ignored. When intelligence is less effective 
and nears the minimum of 0, the government’s attrition to the insurgency in equation (12) 
is based on the effort expended by the government and the size of the insurgency ( )I tγ , 
as in the Deitchman guerrilla model: ( )IA I tγµ= . Recall that the insurgency parameter 
I(t) is a number between 0 and 1 so that we are reducing the government effectiveness γ  
if we multiply by I(t). This relationship rewards effective intelligence by the government 
and punishes early insurgency growth before they are prepared to effectively resist 
government COIN efforts. An insurgency must walk the tightrope of sustaining 
recruitment and offensive operations versus growing too big too fast. The larger an 
insurgency is in terms of size and effort the easier it is for the government to effectively 
target the insurgency. 
Attrition against the population, PA , can be broken down into two parts: attrition 
caused by either the insurgency API or the government APG. 
P PI PGA A A= +            (13) 
Attrition caused to the population by the insurgency is generally directed violence 
of the coercive sort: assassination of village leaders, doctors, and other important figures 
who represent a threat to the insurgency or who openly support the government. Generic 
violence against the population can also be useful to the insurgency by undermining 
government popular support by showing that the government cannot provide for the 
security of the population.  In our model, this attrition is represented by the size of the 
insurgency at time t: ( )I t , multiplied by an insurgent population attrition factor Pα , in 
practice usually a small number between 0 and 1, which represents the level of 
insurgency violence directed against the population.  
( )PI PA I tα=           (14) 
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The negative impact of coercion on attempts by the insurgency to gain popular support 
can undermine painstaking efforts to acquire that support. (O’Neill, 2005) There would 
seem to be a law of diminishing returns where a backlash would occur against an 
insurgency policy of extreme coercion to maintain popular support.  
Attrition caused to the population by the government is usually collateral damage 
from poor intelligence and ineffective attacks against the insurgency. The insurgency can 
actually attempt to adopt strategies to increase collateral damage (urban warfare) to turn 
the population against the government. (O’Neill, 2005) Collateral damage can be broken 
down into the kinetic efforts the government is directing against the insurgency that 
“miss” the insurgency, random carpet bombing, and just plain bad intelligence. The 
model represents this attrition as a product of the government attrition coefficient,γ , the 
complement of the government intelligence factor, (1 )µ− , and the complement of the 
size of the insurgency, (1 )I− , which effectively represents the non-insurgents who are 
suffering collateral damage from the government.   
(1 )(1 ( ))PGA I tγ µ= − −          (15) 
The smaller the overall offensive effort,γ , the better the intelligence,µ , and the 
larger the size of the insurgency, ( )I t , the smaller the overall collateral damage APG 
caused to the population as a whole. This collateral damage to the population is 
essentially the ‘area fire’ portion of the government effort (1 )γ µ−  that does not hit the 
insurgency (1 ( )I t− ).  
C. POPULATION DYNAMICS 
The entire population pool in our model is divided into two classes: supporters 
and contrarians. Insurgents are a subclass of the contrarians. Individuals move between 
the supporter and contrarian classes based on the relationships in the transition equations 
where the change in the population balance depends on the size of both the supporter and 
contrarian populations multiplied by the transition parameter SCρ . 
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 ' SCS SCρ=           (16) 
     ' SCC SCρ= −           (17)  
Transitions from one population to another may results from contact between 
contrarians and supporters (Castillo Chavez and Song, 2004) and by word of mouth in 
rural areas. 
The insurgency recruits directly from the contrarian population that are not yet 
insurgents ( )C I− . Active recruiting for the insurgency is in direct relation to the size of 
the insurgency ( )I t , and the recruiting parameter CIρ . Total recruitment per time step is 
the interaction between the recruitment parameter and the respective sizes of C(t) and I(t). 
( )CI C I Iρ −           (18) 
The recruitment parameter CIρ represents a positive change in the insurgency size 
reflecting the insurgency’s ability and effort to recruit personnel. Successful attacks 
against the government and unsuccessful attacks against the insurgency (resulting in 
collateral damage) are events that could have a positive impact on this parameter, while 
visible attrition against the insurgency would similarly have a negative impact. One 
simple way to represent insurgency recruitment is where recruitment is a monotonically 
increasing function of AG and APG and monotonically decreasing in AI. 
CIρ =AG+APG-AI          (19) 
Kaplan and Jacobson (2006) assert that terrorist recruitment can be dependent on 
government actions and the planned future needs of the terrorists. In other words, smart 
terrorists will base their recruitment on planned future operations and not conscript forces 
just to increase their overall size and hence their signature as a target. Another 
complicated contributor to the recruitment parameter for the insurgency is the attrition 
caused to the population by the insurgency. This violence against the population can be 
characterized as coercion or targeted killings against government supporters. Coercion 
has its limits. Actions that victimize the population can undermine previous painstaking 
efforts to acquire support that apply on various combinations of techniques that avoid 
coercion. Mao recognized this and clearly articulated it in a code of conduct called “Eight 
Points of Attention,” a “politeness” guide to avoid population resentment against the 
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insurgency. (O’Neill, 2005)  It would be too simplistic to include insurgency attrition 
against the population as a negative contributor to their recruitment efforts. There is 
definitely a diminished and ultimately negative return for overly coercive and violent 
behavior. No matter who is causing the violence, the government is sure to shoulder 
much of the blame as one of government’s primary responsibilities is the security of the 
population. 
The population transition parameter, SCρ , is a snapshot of the popular will at any 
particular time. A positive parameter represents increased support for the government 
forces, while a negative parameter represents the opposite, increased support for the 
contrarians, and hence, the insurgency. A straightforward and simple way that the 
government or insurgency can influence the population opinion is by attriting the other 
side, with the assumption of perfect information by the population to determine who is 
causing the violence. Hence, SCρ  is monotonically increasing in AI and monotonically 
decreasing in AG. There is an underlying assumption that the population transition 
follows a ‘bandwagon’ affect, that the side that seems to be winning gains the most 
support. There are conditions in which this may not be true (casualties to an insurgency 
incite more support form the population as in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the 
summer of 2006), but these situations are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The security of the population is also of prime importance. Historically, the 
critical test of legitimacy is the ability of one side or the other to guarantee the security of 
the population; the government must demonstrate that it can fight the insurgency 
effectively while also protecting the population. (Lynn, 2005) This includes minimizing 
collateral damage (APG), and protecting the population from the violence caused by the 
insurgents (API). The effect of Government collateral damage against the population is 
generally pretty straightforward; SCρ  is monotonically decreasing in APG. Attrition 
against the population by the insurgency can have a more complicated effect. The 
perception of the population is of prime importance. Is the insurgency at fault for having 
attacked the population or is the government at fault for failing to protect the population 
from the insurgency? API is therefore a more complicated portion of the population 
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influence that would seem to depend on additional factors. A basic additive model could 
have the attrition to the population caused by the insurgency increase popular support for 
the government or create more contrarians (hence the ±  sign in equation 20). 
I PI G PG=A A -A -ASCρ ±          (20) 
Finally, we have the total insurgency strength change over time. This equation 
represents the attrition caused to the insurgency by the government, equation (12), and 
the recruitment the insurgency gained in the last time period, equation (18). 
' ( )I CII A C I Iρ= − + −          (21) 
The insurgency must overcome the attrition caused by the government with 
positive recruitment from its base supporting population, the contrarians.  
D. COMPLETE MODEL 








ρ= −       
( )I CI
dI A C I I
dt
ρ= − + −  
where: 
G GA Iα=  
( (1 ) )IA Iγ µ µ= + −  
P PI PGA A A= +  
(1 )(1 )PGA Iγ µ= − −  
PI PA Iα=            (22) 
A couple of notes about the complete model: as noted, 0 ( ) 1S t≤ ≤ , 0 ( ) 1C t≤ ≤ , 
0 ( ) 1I t≤ ≤  and ( ) ( )I t C t≤ . Also recall that ( ) ( ) 1S t C t+ = . The intelligence parameter, 




A. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis of our model is going to focus on the interaction between the 
insurgency attrition and the population dynamics. The primary purpose of our analysis is 
to attain operational insights with regard to fighting and defeating an insurgency. We use 
real world data from the current conflict in Iraq to estimate parameters regarding attrition 
rates, insurgency recruitment rate, government intelligence and response efforts, and 
population dynamics.  
Our methodology consists of the following steps: (1) analysis of available 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) data, (2) determining a set of parameters and functions 
based on the OIF data and specifying time resolution, (3) implementing a basic model 
and (4) implementing an advanced model.  
1. Analysis of OIF Data 
The OIF conflict has evolved in two phases: the American led coalition effort to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power in March 2003, and the subsequent attempts to 
stabilize the country and establish a democratic Iraqi government. In this thesis we focus 
on the second phase: the stabilization portion of this conflict. There is a host of 
information available about the current conflict in Iraq.  The data is current, well 
documented, widely available, and generally unclassified. While the conflict in Iraq may 
not exactly fit the strict definition of an insurgence because of the sectarian violence and 
American presence and responsibility for the conflict, it contains many of the elements of 
an insurgency: an internal nonruling group utilizing guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics 
against both the government and the population to destroy or reformulate one or more 
aspects of the ruling faction. We recognize that the data does not derive from a 
prototypical insurgency. 
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Information about OIF is widely available but there is widely differing opinions 
about the validity of some of the data. Statistics about coalition force levels and coalition 
casualties are available from the Department of Defense (DOD) and this information is 
very accurate. Iraqi government military and para-military force strength and casualty 
data is less reliable. Some of this data is skewed for political purposes as the size and 
quality of these forces are considered an important benchmark representing the ability of 
the Iraqi government to secure the country and allow American forces to depart.  
The last few data elements in which we are most interested are the most difficult 
to collect and few agencies agree about its accuracy: Iraqi population casualties and 
insurgency size and casualties. During most asymmetric conflicts it is very difficult to 
exactly determine the size and strength of insurgencies. Estimations can be made based 
on violence and activity levels and numbers of insurgents killed or captured, but these 
statistics can be misleading. The Iraqi population casualty data suffers from a different 
problem: politicization of the war. The number of deaths of civilians in Iraq during OIF 
differs by an order of magnitude in some reports: from 60,000 to over 600,000.  
(O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007)  The high end (600,000+) figures were reported by a 
British online medical journal (Karadsheh, 2006) a month ahead of 2006 American 
Congressional elections and have generally not gained wide acceptance. Most reasonable 
forums report numbers closer to the 50-80,000 range. These numbers agree with the 
politically active website Iraq Body Count.  (Dardagan, 2007)  
Our primary source for data about the conflict in Iraq was supplied by the 
Department of Defense Center for Army Analysis (CAA) in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A 
significant portion of the unclassified CAA data on the OIF conflict is collected from The 
Brookings Institute (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007) and their monthly Iraqi Index 
document. The Iraqi Index is a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion, and 
security data providing updated information on various criteria, including crime, 
telephone and water service, troop fatalities, unemployment, Iraqi security forces, oil 
production, and coalition troop strength. (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007) Our primary 
reference for the Iraqi population casualty data is the political website Iraqi Body Count. 
(Dardagan, 2007) Although this is a political website operated by individuals with strong 
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opinions about the war in Iraq, their data is well documented and investigated. Each 
casualty is listed by date, location, cause of death and the original media source where the 
website obtained the data. Multiple casualties caused during one incident are recorded by 
their minimum and maximum reported values when there is any question about how 
many people were actually killed in an attack. The OIF data that we use in this analysis is 
listed in Appendix A.  
2. Initial Parameters and Time Resolution 
An important part of the analysis is determining realistic initial values for the 
parameters in the model. The initial values are based on data from OIF. The parameters 
we consider are:  
 
Gα : the insurgency attrition coefficient against the government. This parameter 
remains constant in both basic and advanced models. 
Pα : the insurgency attrition coefficient against the population. This parameter 
remains constant in both basic and advanced models. 
γ : the government attrition coefficient against the insurgency. This parameter 
remains constant in the basic model but becomes variable in the advanced model. 
CIρ : the recruitment rate for the insurgency. This parameter remains constant in the 
basic model but becomes variable in the advanced model. 
 
 I(0): the initial portion of the population that is part of  the insurgency. 
 S(0): the initial portion of the population that supports the government. 
 C(0): the initial portion of the population that supports the insurgency. 
 
Both the government effort against the insurgency γ  and the insurgency 
recruitment parameter CIρ  are held constant in the basic model shown in Section B. This 
assumption will be relaxed in the advanced model presented in Section C. 
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Our primary goal in the analysis of the OIF data is to determine “ballpark” initial 
conditions to start the insurgency and population model. This analysis is not an in-depth 
statistical analysis and arguments can be made for utilizing other methods of examining 
the data.    
The first three initial conditions are the division of the starting population between 
government supporters and contrarians,  (0)S  and (0)C , and the initial proportion of the 
insurgency in the population, (0)I . The initial division of the population is determined 
by a public opinion poll of Iraqi civilians during the beginning OIF. (O’Hanlon & 
Campbell, 2007) In this opinion poll 66% of the population agreed with the direction the 
country was heading. We can tenuously translate this to 66% initial support for the 
government. The initial proportion of the insurgency in the population is obtained by 
dividing the initial size of the insurgency (3500 individuals in May 2003) (O’Hanlon & 
Campbell, 2007) by the total population of Iraq (26M): (0)I  = 0.000135.  
Next we estimate the insurgency attrition coefficients against the government and 
against the population, Gα  and Pα  respectively. Recall the attrition equations (8) and 
(14) in Chapter III for the violence against the government and the violence against the 
population caused by the insurgency. Solving for the attrition parameters Gα  and Pα  















                     (23) 
The Iraqi population casualty from the Iraq Body count database (Dardagan, 
2007) does not differentiate between who caused the violence. However, according to the 
United States military, the collateral damage rate by the coalition forces is approximately 
7 civilians killed per week in 2005, 4 civilians per week in the first half of 2006, and 1 
per week in the last half of 2006. (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007) This attrition to the 
population is not negligible and will have to be removed from the total population 
casualty data. With these equations we can estimate the attrition coefficients Gα  and Pα  
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by utilizing the data in Appendix A and dividing the average number of casualties 
suffered by the government and the population from May 2003 until March 2007 (197 
and 1240 respectively) by the average size of the insurgency from May 2003 until March 
2007 (19595). (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007) These final estimates are 0.0101Gα =  and 
0.0633Pα = .  
In the basic model, the insurgency recruitment and the government attrition 
coefficient are fixed throughout and will be calculated by utilizing the data in Appendix 
A. The average rate of change in the size of the insurgency is used to roughly estimate the 
parameter CIρ . Let I∆ denote the average monthly rate of change over the period May 
2003 to March 2007. Then (see Equation (18) in Chapter III) we approximate 
( (0) (0)) (0)CII C I Iρ∆ −              (24) 
Solving for the recruitment parameter yields: 
( (0) (0)) (0)CI
I
C I I
ρ ∆−         (25) 
The average change in the insurgency size over the period May 2003 until March 
2007 is 1446 individuals (see Appendix A). We divide this figure by the total population 
to bring it to our scale. Thus, I∆ =0.000056. The initial contrarian and insurgency 
parameters where calculated above: (0) 0.33C =  and (0) 0.000135I = . We can now 
calculate a ballpark figure for the recruitment parameter: 
.000056 1.25
(0.33 .000135).000135CI
ρ =−  
Now to estimate the government attrition coefficient we solve equation 12 in 




γ µ µ= + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
.        (26) 
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Here G is the actual size of the government force, AI is the average monthly 
attrition sustained by the insurgency (see Appendix A), I is the average insurgency 
strength, and the intelligence level µ  is assumed to be 0.5. The average coalition force 
plus the Iraqi government force is 335,000 (see Appendix A), the average insurgency 
strength is 19595, and the average attrition sustained by the insurgency, IA , is 215 per 
month. Utilizing equation 26 we obtain 215ˆ
335,000[.5 (1 .5)19595]
γ = + − =.0000000655 or 
6.5x10-8. Since we normalize for the government force, and assume G=1 throughout, we 
need to multiply γˆ  by 335,000 to obtain .022γ = . Once again, we are interested in 
obtaining ballpark figures for these parameters, not predicting outcomes.  
All of OIF data is broken down in terms of months so our initial parameters are 
monthly rates. We will examine the behavior of the insurgency strength and the popular 
support over a reasonable period of time (around 60 months or 5 years). In certain cases it 
will be interesting to examine the behavior of the model over a longer time period to see 
if the model outcome changes over extended periods of time.  
3. Basic Model Setup 
In the basic model we assume that the government attrition coefficient γ  and the 
insurgency recruitment parameter CIρ  are constants. The other parameters that 
dynamically change over time are the intelligence parameter µ , which depends on 
popular support, and the population transition parameter SCρ , which depends on the 
various types of attrition. Initially we will assume a linear relationship between the 
intelligence level µ  and the popular support of the government S. Our initial assumption 
for the population transition parameter will be a simple additive function of the 
population, government, and insurgency attrition values: SC I G PA A Aρ = − − . Basically, 
both the insurgency and the government lose support whenever they experience 
casualties. Recall that PA is the total attrition to the population: P PI PGA A A= + . 
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4. Advanced Model Setup 
In the advanced model the government attrition coefficient γ  and the insurgency 
recruitment parameter CIρ  are no longer constant. Each is represented by a function of 
the government, insurgency, and population attrition. All of the other initial conditions 
are the same as in the basic model.  
B. BASIC MODEL  
The parameters and functions for the base run of the basic model are summarized 
in Table 1.   
 
Parameter Equation/Value 
Gα  0.0101 
Pα  0.0633 
CIρ  1.25 
γ  0.022 
(0)S  0.66 
(0)C  0.34 
( )I t  0.000135 
SCρ  I G PA A A− −  
µ  S  
Table 1.   Initial Functions and Values for the Basic Model 
 
With our initial conditions and parameters we recursively iterate over a period of 
60 time units (60 months) and observe the following plots of the population ratios and 
insurgency strength (Figures 4 and 5). Based on the plots in Figure 4 and 5, there seems 
to be little change in the population dynamics (Figure 4) but after 36 months the 

































Figure 5.   Insurgency Strength in Base Run (60 months): Basic Model 
 
If there is no change in the dynamics of the conflict, we can expect the insurgency 
to continue growing until they displace the government. Figure 6 and 7 show the model 
extended out to 120 months. As expected, the insurgency continues to grow and reaches 
almost 100% of the contrarian strength (0.57 versus 0.59). This is an idealized scenario as 


































Figure 7.   Insurgency Strength in Base Run (120 months): Basic Model 
 
The insurgency strength ( )I t  does not follow a simple curve in Figure 7. While 
( )I t  is monotonically increasing it suffers a slowing of growth around month 72. This is 
a result of the initial growth of the insurgency outpacing the initial contrarian growth in 
the population. The insurgency quickly reaches a size where they are unable to recruit 
effectively from the contrarian population. Recall that the total recruitment for the 
insurgency is ( )CI C I Iρ − . When I approaches C, the C I−  portion of this equation 
approaches 0 and the insurgency total recruitment approaches 0 too. At month 50 we see 
an increase in the slope of the graph of the contrarian support in Figure 6, so the 
insurgency success begins to feed off of this increased contrarian support. Success breeds 
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more success and the population quickly begins to support the insurgency. Figure 8 is a 
graphic illustration of the initial interaction between the insurgency and the non-
insurgency contrarians ( )C I I− . 
 















Figure 8.   Insurgency and Contrarian Interaction over Time 
 
Figure 8 shows that initially (months 0 to 60) the insurgency/contrarian 
interaction experiences a sharp spike. As the insurgency grows it outpaces the 
contrarians’ abilities to provide fresh recruits (months 60 to 80). The insurgency success 
begins to fuel contrarian support in the population (after month 50 in Figure 6) and the 
pool of recruits for the insurgency begins to grow again (after month 80 in Figure 8). This 
dramatic growth followed by a dramatic decline in growth is an interesting aspect of the 
model and could represent a situation where the insurgency may be growing too big too 
quickly. The overall growth of the insurgency is limited by the size of the contrarian 
support in the population. In this base run of the basic model the government is unable to 
take advantage of this fact.  
We demonstrate the importance of intelligence µ  by examining the outcome of 
the conflict utilizing different intelligence parameters µ . In the base run of the basic 
model we assume that the intelligence parameter is linearly dependent on the government 
support in the population, Sµ = . In Chapter III we presented other possible functions 
(Figure 3 in Chapter III) that could also represent this intelligence parameter. We could 
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improve the intelligence return from the supporting population by representing the 
intelligence parameter as a concave function of the popular support to the government S . 
This means that the government receives good intelligence unless they have very little 
support in the population. The alternative to the increased intelligence from the 
supporting population is the convex function. The concave and convex intelligence 
functions were derived based on the following equations (see Chapter III, Figure 3): 








−= −               (27) 
Convex:       ( 1)( ) ( ) SS S t e βµ − −=         (28) 
By adjusting the β  parameter in each equation we can adjust the convexity or concavity 
of the intelligence equation. Figure 9 graphically shows the concave and convex 
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Figure 9.   Concave, Linear and Convex Intelligence Functions for 5β = .  
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Figure 10.   Concave, Linear and Convex Intelligence Functions for 0.5β =   
 
This change in the way we view the effect of population support on the 
availability of good intelligence to the government results in dramatically increased 
intelligence for the government and a quick defeat for the insurgency (the thick line at the 
bottom of Figure 11). A convex intelligence function (dashed line in Figure 11) has the 
opposite effect; it increases the growth of the insurgency in a shorter amount of time. 
This analysis of intelligence in the base model leads to a couple of interesting insights: 
(a) the model portrays the affects of an increased or decreased intelligence ability of the 
government and (b) increasing or decreasing the intelligence ability of the government 
has a strong impact on the outcome of the model. (Note the change in the Y-scale of 




















Figure 11.   Intelligence Functions Effect On ( )I t in  Base Model ( 5β = ) 
 
The population transition SCρ  is the most complex parameter we attempt to 
model. The decision by an individual to support the government or support the 
insurgency can be extremely complex. The most important model factors that affect this 
decision are the perception of who is winning the conflict and who is causing the 
violence against the population. In our basic run we assume that the government is held 
responsible by the public for all of the violence committed against the population. This 
seems reasonable as the prime responsibility of the government is the security of the 
population. If the government is able to convince the population that the insurgency is 
responsible for the violence then we have a new population transition parameter, 
SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − − . The results of this change in the population parameter on the 
strength of the insurgency are graphically displayed in Figure 12. (In this run of the basic 
















Figure 12.   Base Model ( )I t with SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  (60 months) 
 
There seems to be no slowing of the growth of the insurgency with the new 
population parameter ( SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − − ). If we extend the time horizon to 120 














Figure 13.   Base Model ( )I t with SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  (120 months) 
 
This is an interesting situation where the insurgency enjoys initial success but 
begins to suffer a very gradual decline in strength. The reason for this decline is 
explained by the population dynamics represented in Figure 14. The new population 
transition parameter SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  has completely changed the outcome of 
the contrarian and government popular support. Support level for the government is now 
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monotonically increasing while contrarian support is monotonically decreasing. Contrast 
Figure 13 where the government has started to reverse the growth of the insurgency after 
80 months to Figure 7 where the insurgency experienced virtually unchecked growth. 
The challenge to the government is to affect this change in a reasonable amount of time 



















Figure 14.   Base Model Population Division with SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  
 
C. ADVANCED MODEL  
This model has the same difference equations as the basic model (Equation 22 in 
Chapter III). We now introduce more complexity into the government attrition effort, γ , 
and the insurgency recruitment, CIρ , which were held constant in the basic model case. 
This increased complexity is accomplished by making these two parameters dynamic and 
dependent on the population, government and insurgency attrition. We will start with 
basic additive functions of the attrition parameters, much like the initial function for the 
population transition parameter in the basic model ( SC I G PA A Aρ = − − ).  
The government efforts to attrite the insurgency depend on the insurgency 
violence against the government and the overall violence against the population. A 
logical assumption is that government efforts against the insurgency increase with 
increased violence against the government and the population by the insurgency. Also, a 
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general outcry from collateral damage caused by the government could curtail 
government efforts against the insurgency.  Initially we assume a linear additive 
relationship: G PI PGA A Aγ = + − . This equation can be modified for a more complex 
relationship. The overall government effort is a response to insurgency violence against 
the government while placing a premium on protecting the population from insurgency 
violence and collateral damage. This is accomplished by increasing the government 
efforts when the insurgency attacks the government or the population, and reducing 
government efforts when there is collateral damage.  
It is reasonable to assume that the recruitment for the insurgency will follow in a 
manner similar to the population transition from supporters to contrarians. Attrition to the 
insurgency is embarrassing and leads to defeat while attrition to the government and 
collateral damage by the government draws recruits (both contrarians (C) and insurgents 
(I)). Modeling the effect of attrition to the population by the insurgency on CIρ  is more 
complicated. Initially we assume that these coercive efforts against the population are 
successful and/or the government takes the blame for the insurgency violence against the 
population. These assumptions lead to the following recruitment parameter: 
( )CI G P IA A Aρ δ= + − , where δ  is a scaling factor. The scaling is necessary because of 
the quadratic nature of the recruitment function (Equation 18 in Chapter III). Table 2 
shows the complete list of parameter values and functions for the advanced model.  
 
Parameter Equation/Value 
Gα  0.0101 
Pα  0.0633 
CIρ  ( )G P IA A Aδ + −  
γ  G PI PGA A A+ −  
(0)S  0.66 
(0)S  0.34 
(0)I  0.000135 
SCρ  I G PA A A− −  
µ  S  
Table 2.   Initial Functions and Values for the Advanced Model 
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The δ portion of the recruitment function CIρ  is a scaling constant that is set to 
250 throughout the advanced model. We once again iterate over 60 months and 
graphically display the results of the conflict in Figures 15 and 16. Once again the 
popular support seems to be unchanged while the insurgency is gaining strength. In the 
advanced model the insurgency experiences increased growth after month 36 (Figure 16). 


































Figure 16.   Insurgency Strength in Base Run of Advanced Model 
 
If we extend the run of the base run of the advanced model out to 120 months we 
achieve the results in Figures 17 and 18. Figure 18 verifies that the growth of the 
insurgency has slowed but not stopped. The knee in the curve of the insurgency growth 
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(much like the basic model in Figure 7) is partially explained by the interaction between 

































Figure 18.   Insurgency Strength in Base Run of Advanced Model 
 
As in the base model, the insurgency initially has a large pool of contrarians to 
recruit from. After month 48 in Figure 19 the insurgency has once again outgrown their 
support and they must wait for the contrarian support in the population to increase. At 
this point the interaction between the insurgents and non-insurgent contrarians begins to 
decline (month 48-60 in Figure 19) and remains constant after 60 months.  
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Figure 19.   Insurgency and Contrarian Interaction over Time, Advanced Model 
 
With a base run of both the basic and advanced model we can now compare and 
contrast the two models. The outcome of the strength of the insurgencies over the first six 
months is significantly different. The insurgency in the base model reaches a size of 0.2 
while the insurgency in the advanced model reaches a size of 0.39. Both insurgencies 
suffer a significant slowing of their growth: after 48 months in the advanced model 
(Figure 18) and after 72 months in the basic model (Figure 7).  The variable recruitment 
and government effort parameters in the advanced model seem to have improved the 
growth of the insurgency (to 0.48 in Figure 16). Both models suffer from a slowing of 
insurgency growth due to the insurgency outgrowing their contrarian support. We can 
now continue our analysis of the advanced model by examining the intelligence, 
population, recruitment, and government effort parameters.  
As in the base model we can examine the effect of different intelligence 
parameters on the advanced model. Figure 20 shows the results of utilizing the same 
concave, convex and linear in ( )S t  intelligence functions with 5β = . It is no surprise that 
we achieve essentially the same results as in the basic model: a faster increase in 
insurgency strength for a convex function and another quick defeat for the insurgency 
with the concave function. (Once again note the change in the Y-scale of Figure 20 from 



















Figure 20.   Intelligence Functions Effect On ( )I t  in  Advanced Model 
 
 
Next we examine the effect on the advanced model if we take the attrition against 
the population caused by the insurgency and turn it against the insurgency (as we did in 
the basic model: SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − − ).  There is very little change in the results 
when we change the population transition parameter (Figure 21).  (Once again we have 














Figure 21.   Advanced Model ( )I t with SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  for 60 months 
 
If we extend the time horizon to 120 months (Figure 22) we see that the 















Figure 22.   Advanced Model ( )I t with SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  for 120 months 
 
In the OIF data the attrition caused to the population by the insurgency is an order 
of magnitude bigger than the attrition caused to the government by the insurgency. 
Switching who the population blames for the attrition against the population has a very 
strong impact on the outcome of the population becoming either contrarians or supporters 
of the government (Figure 23). This is not unrealistic as we see similar arguments about 
insurgency violence against the population in Iraq today. The population grows angry at 
both the insurgency for causing the violence and also with the government for failing to 
provide adequate security. The net effect in the advanced model is a reduction in 




















Figure 23.   Advanced Model Population Division with SC I PI G PGA A A Aρ = + − −  
 
Recall that in the advanced model we have replaced the constant recruitment and 
government effort by variable functions. We can now examine the sensitivity of these 
dynamic parameters γ  and CIρ . Our analysis of these parameters allows us to examine 
very simple conflict scenarios and policy actions by both the insurgency and the 
government.  
The insurgency recruitment CIρ  is affected by a host of factors. In the basic 
model this parameter was constant. In addition to the base function 
( )CI G P IA A Aρ δ= + − , we examine two specific recruitment policies/scenarios: 
opportunistic recruitment (the bandwagons effect) and idealistic recruitment.  
Opportunistic recruitment can be defined as individuals joining the “cause” 
because the insurgency seems to be winning, or at least doing better than the government. 
This function then depends on the relative “institutional attrition” to the government and 




ρ ε ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . (Recall that the actual government strength throughout 
the model is defined as a constant which is taken to be 1.)    
The idealistic recruitment scenario can be modeled based on the “activity” level 
of the insurgency. In this case the recruitment parameter CIρ  would be proportional to the 
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total violence in the conflict: ( )CI G I PA A Aρ δ= + + . Figure 24 shows the results of 
utilizing the opportunistic and idealistic recruitment functions compared to the initial 
recruitment function ( ( )CI G P IA A Aρ δ= + − ) and a recruitment function where the 
coercive efforts of the insurgency are counter effective, ( )CI G PG I PIA A A Aρ δ= + − − . We 
can see from the results in Figure 24 that the idealistic and opportunistic recruitment 
functions both have similar insurgency growth to the initial recruitment function 
( )CI G P IA A Aρ δ= + −  but affect the time at which this growth occurs. The fourth 
function, where the coercive efforts of the insurgency are ineffective, has a very different 
result. As in the improved concave intelligence parameter (Figure 20), a change in the 
blame associated with coercive population attrition has a strong impact on the outcome of 
the model (the thick line in Figure 24). In the advanced model run the scaling factors 
δ and ε  are a constant set to 250. (The population transition parameter has been reset to 
its initial value of SC I G PA A Aρ = − − ). (Once again, for Figures 24 and 25, note the 
change in the Y-axis). 
 
















Figure 24.   Recruitment Functions Effect On ( )I t  in  Advanced Model 
 
The government effort parameter γ  is a policy or decision parameter that is based 
on how the government is fundamentally going to react to insurgency violence and 
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violence against the population (both insurgency and government inflicted).  Up to this 
point the government effort against the insurgency has been constant (in the basic model) 
or a linear function of the violence committed against the government and the population 
by the insurgency and the collateral damage caused to the population by the government. 
Another possible function could be a direct reaction to the violence directed against the 
government: GAγ ≈ . This policy ignores an important aspect of the government’s primary 
responsibilities: the protection of the population. We can modify the government effort 
by taking into account a reaction to violence against the population: G PIA Aγ ≈ + . Figure 
25 shows the results of implementing these functions in the advanced model. (The 
recruitment parameter has been reset to the initial value of ( )CI G P IA A Aρ δ= + − ). 
 















Figure 25.   Government γ  Functions Effect On ( )I t in  Advanced Model 
 
Unsurprisingly, if the government can ignore the collateral damage they cause 
they can attack the insurgency most effectively (thick line at the bottom of Figure 25). It 
is interesting to note that the government receives positive results from protecting the 
population and avoiding collateral damage (thin solid line in Figure 25) versus a simple 
direct reaction to the amount of violence the insurgency directs against the government 
(the dashed line in Figure 25) . 
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Our primary results of comparing both the basic model and the advanced model 
are that the insurgency grows at a greater initial rate in the advanced model but that both 
models experience slowing of growth due to their diminishing pool of contrarian recruits.  
The change in the intelligence parameter functioned in the same way in both models: a 
concave function improved government efforts against the insurgency while a convex 
function hurt these efforts (Figures 11 and 20).  A change in the population parameter to 
hold the insurgency responsible for insurgency attrition against the population also had a 
similar effect in both models as demonstrated in Figures 13 and 22. In the advanced 
model we could expand the analysis of the basic model by examining variable insurgency 
recruitment and government effort. Figures 24 shows the results of simple recruitment 
policy decisions by the insurgency and Figure 25 shows the results of simple government 
policy decisions on how to attack the insurgency. These decisions can have a strong 
impact on the outcome of the conflict: a defeated insurgency when coercive violence is 
not effective ( ( )CI G PG I PIA A A Aρ δ= + − − ) and when the government can ignore 
collateral damage to the population ( G PIA Aγ ≈ + ).  
D. FINAL NOTES 
Analyzing basic OIF casualty and force data allowed us to determine some 
realistic initial conditions for the insurgency and population models. An argument could 
be made that a better measure of the effort of the insurgency against both the government 
and the population would be the number attacks attempted by the insurgency. Clearly the 
military forces are better able to protect themselves and have only increased these 
abilities as the conflict has gone on. According to Major General Webster of the coalition 
forces, the number of successful attacks against the coalition and Iraqi forces dropped to 
about 10% in the summer of 2005 from a high of 25% - 30% in the summer of 2004. 
(O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007) Our argument is that the number of casualties endured by 








A.  RESULTS 
In this thesis we have explored the idea that conventional attrition models and 
epidemic population models can be combined to form new unconventional warfare 
models.  
In Chapter III we developed this model based on Lanchester-type difference 
equations and epidemiological models based on the flow of information and ideas in a 
population.  
In Chapter IV we analyzed the insurgency model based on a host of initial starting 
conditions and different parameter functions. We started with a base model and quickly 
moved on to a more advanced model with more interesting interactions between the 
attrition and the popular support. Comparing these two implementations we observe that 
the advanced model allowed for faster insurgency growth over the first 60 months but 
that both models suffer a slowing of insurgency growth due to a shrinking recruitment 
pool of contrarians. The advanced model also allows us to examine some simple changes 
in policy in insurgency recruitment and government efforts against the insurgency 
The most important result from our work is that there is some utility in utilizing 
epidemic population models in asymmetric warfare to attempt to model population 
support for contending factions. The framework developed here may be utilized to study 
past and present insurgencies in order to gain insight into the importance of the popular 
will in these types of conflicts.  
Operationally the most significant observation is that the contest between the 
insurgency and the government is not predetermined: the decisions and actions of the 
government and/or the insurgency determine the outcome of the conflict. Our insurgency 
model demonstrates this fact.  
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B.  FUTURE RESEARCH 
In our opinion this thesis contains many possibilities for applied mathematics and 
combat modeling. Many subtleties of the attrition-population model interaction have been 
left unexplored. A natural continuation of this work could include the following:  
1. Expanding the state space of the population to include neutrals, semi-fanatic, 
and other possible population sub-classes. (Castillo-Chavez & Song, 2004) 
2. Expanding the population transition parameter to multiple parameters based on 
a variety of soft government and insurgent efforts: Civil Affairs, Psychological 
Operations, etc.  
 3. A much more in depth study of how government intelligence can be modeled 
and if it is directly related to popular support for the government.  
 4. A more in depth study of the best way to model insurgency recruitment: 
coercive violence versus other recruitment policies.  
 5. A more extensive and detailed examination of different insurgency and 
government policies and decisions and how they affect the model including historical 
policies and decision and how they possibly fit into the model.  
 6. An examination of other historical insurgency data. In particular the Malayan 
Emergency, Vietnam and the recent conflicts between Israel and the PLO/Lebanon would 
seem to lend themselves to this analysis as they are well documented with a lot of 
accurate data.  
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APPENDIX A.  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM DATA 
Below is the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Coalition, Iraqi Government, Iraqi 
civilian population and insurgency force levels and casualty data. 
 

























Mar-03 0 0 0 65 6,415   
Apr-03 0 0 0 74 1,030   
May-03 173,000 9,000 182,000 37 463 200 0 
Jun-03 171,000 15,000 186,000 98 570 400 0 
Jul-03 170,000 30,000 200,000 116 591 600 0 
Aug-03 161,000 37,170 198,170 103 741 600 50 
Sep-03 156,000 44,200 200,200 99 504 700 50 
Oct-03 156,000 66,800 222,800 112 452 900 100 
Nov-03 146,900 94,800 241,700 150 415 900 150 
Dec-03 146,500 100,100 246,600 108 486 650 100 
Jan-04 147,600 108,800 256,400 115 525 600 150 
Feb-04 139,000 125,000 264,000 88 536 650 150 
Mar-04 154,000 134,991 288,991 120 916 800 100 
Apr-04 162,000 124,253 286,253 203 1,182 1,600 150 
May-04 162,000 135,712 297,712 148 574 1,650 150 
Jun-04 161,000 145,317 306,317 110 795 1,400 250 
Jul-04 162,000 95,088 257,088 122 710 1,500 250 
Aug-04 163,700 91,468 255,168 134 775 2,700 300 
Sep-04 162,600 98,708 261,308 148 859 1,800 200 
Oct-04 162,000 110,998 272,998 131 859 2,000 400 
Nov-04 162,000 113,506 275,506 205 1,484 2,500 400 
Dec-04 173,000 122,453 295,453 140 846 1,600 350 
Jan-05 175,300 125,373 300,673 216 955 2,300 500 
Feb-05 180,000 141,761 321,761 161 1,167 1,400 350 
Mar-05 172,000 151,911 323,911 211 659 1,300 200 
Apr-05 164,000 159,493 323,493 251 894 1,500 250 
May-05 161,000 168,227 329,227 339 1,138 1,700 300 
Jun-05 158,000 168,854 326,854 374 1,152 1,550 350 
Jul-05 161,000 173,900 334,900 358 1,357 2,000 400 
Aug-05 161,000 182,900 343,900 367 2,089 2,100 500 
Sep-05 160,000 192,100 352,100 282 1,198 2,100 400 
Oct-05 174,000 211,000 385,000 311 1,083 2,600 450 
 54
Nov-05 183,000 214,000 397,000 260 1,169 1,600 350 
Dec-05 183,000 223,700 406,700 261 915 2,000 500 
Jan-06 157,000 227,300 384,300 251 1,265 1,700 350 
Feb-06 153,000 232,100 385,100 213 1,262 1,750 600 
Mar-06 153,000 250,500 403,500 224 1,538 2,200 600 
Apr-06 152,000 253,700 405,700 277 1,290 2,600 650 
May-06 152,000 263,400 415,400 218 1,809 2,850 700 
Jun-06 146,900 264,600 411,500 189 2,053 2,800 700 
Jul-06 149,000 269,600 418,600 266 3,033 3,400 800 
Aug-06 157,000 298,000 455,000 296 2,676 3,300 800 
Sep-06 162,000 307,800 469,800 220 2,208 3,900 900 
Oct-06 161,200 312,400 473,600 328 2,781 4,350 1,100 
Nov-06 158,000 323,000 481,000 191 2,833 3,650 900 
Dec-06 155,200 323,000 478,200 232 2,419 3,900 1,000 
Jan-07 146,650 323,180 469,830 179 2,022   
Feb-07 149,010 329,800 478,810 229 2,061   
Mar-07 155,205 334,300 489,505 299 1,169   
 



















May-03 3500 3,500 1,000 120  
Jun-03 3500  3,500 1,000 120   
Jul-03 4000 4,000 1,000 120  
Aug-03 4000  4,000 1,000 120   
Sep-03 5000 5,000 750 90  
Oct-03 5000  5,000 750 90   
Nov-03 5,000 500 5,500 3,000 360  
Dec-03 5,000 500 5,500 1,000 120   
Jan-04 5,500 500 6,000 2,500 300  
Feb-04 5,500 500 6,000 2,000 240   
Mar-04 5,500 500 6,000 1,750 210  
Apr-04 5,500 500 6,000 2,000 240   
May-04 15,500 500 16,000 2,000 240  
Jun-04 15,500 500 16,000 1,220 146 5,435 
Jul-04 20,500 500 21,000 1,000 120 5,700 
Aug-04 20,500 500 21,000 2,500 300   
Sep-04 20,500 500 21,000 2,500 300 5,500 
Oct-04 20,500 500 21,000 2,000 240 4,300 
Nov-04 20,500 500 21,000 3,000 360 8,300 
Dec-04 20,500 500 21,000 2,000 240   
Jan-05 18,500 500 19,000 2,500 300 7,837 
Feb-05 18,500 500 19,000 1,000 120   
Mar-05 16,500 1,000 17,500 1,000 120  
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Apr-05 16,500 1,000 17,500 1,000 120   
May-05 17,000 1,000 18,000 2,000 240  
Jun-05 21,000 1,000 22,000 2,000 240 10,783 
Jul-05 21,000 2,000 23,000 2,000 240 15,000 
Aug-05 21,000 2,000 23,000 3,000 360 14,000 
Sep-05 22,000 2,000 24,000 3,000 360 14,000 
Oct-05 22,000 2,000 24,000 2,000 240 13,000 
Nov-05 22,000 2,000 24,000 2,000 240 13,000 
Dec-05 22,000 2,000 24000 2,000 240 14,000 
Jan-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 2,000 240 14,000 
Feb-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 2,000 240 14,767 
Mar-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 2,000 240 15,000 
Apr-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 2,000 240 15,000 
May-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 1,000 240 15,000 
Jun-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 1,000 240 14,500 
Jul-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 1,000 240 13,000 
Aug-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 1,000 240 13,000 
Sep-06 22,000 2,000 24,000 750 240 13,000 
Oct-06 30,000 2,000 32,000 750 241 13,000 
Nov-06 30,000 2,000 32,000 3,000 241 13,000 
Dec-06 30,000 2,000 32,000 1,000 241 13,000 
Jan-07 30,000 2,000 32,000 2,500 241 14,000 
Feb-07 30,000 2,000 32,000 2,000 241 15,000 
Mar-07 70,000 2,000 72,000 1,750 241 17,000 
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